

“Dis a fi wi Thing”: **Politics and** **The Rise of Organised Crime in Jamaica**

by

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Introduction

Jamaican organised crime has become a powerful force in the country and a significant player in the underworld of the metropolitan centres of the USA and the UK. It is thus at once internal and external. The major networks have accumulated vast fortunes from the international drug trade, extortion and other rackets. Using this criminally acquired wealth, it has penetrated various sectors of the formal economy as a party in symbiotic relations with previously legitimate business and as independent operators. It thus operates in the illegal and legal spheres, bridging and combining both. It dominates a significant number of the communities of the urban poor in the main cities and both protect and prey on them. It systematically engages in criminality outside of its territory while “policing” inside it. It is grounded in these communities but has extended its criminal ties into the upper rungs of the social hierarchy. In its complicated relationships with the communities and the political parties it is respectively both patron, and client\patron. On these bases, it is able to influence political outcomes by funding the electoral campaigns of political party candidates and delivering the votes in intra and inter-party contests. It is an important factor in street politics and in violent confrontations between the parties or “uncivil politics.” It wields considerable coercive power in selected communities *and* enjoys a robust referent power among young males in

these localities. Organised crime bridges the above mentioned contrasting categories, that is, internal\external, local\national, illegal\legal, predatory\protective, criminal”police”, patron\client, coercive\seductive, thereby demonstrating its flexibility and complexity and signifying the enormity of the challenge that it presents for the society.

Organised crime is a new phenomenon in the Caribbean region. The arguable exception is Cuba’s pre-1959 experience with the American Mafia but this was largely an offshore operation in which Cuba was simply its host. Much of the extant work on this phenomenon, which, as will be discussed later, takes various forms and extends to a wide range of activity, have largely been restricted to analyses of drug-trafficking and have been pitched at the regional level (see Meingot 1999; 1994; Griffith 1997). Khan-Melnyk (1994) has explored the drug trade in Jamaica but problematised the trade as an international relations issue (Khan-Melnyk 1994) and Headley (2002) discussed the response of the government to a constructed “narco-terrorism” or rather the violence of organised crime and other criminal groups. As has been the case with the regional studies, the principal concern of the Jamaica studies has been with drug-trafficking which is not exclusively an activity of organised crime, and with drug policy, not with Jamaican organised crime as a focal object of study. There has however been some work on the so-called “Yardies” and “Posses” or organised crime networks in the US (Josephs 1999; Headley 1997), and the UK (.....; Small 1995) but very little has been written on the activities of organized crime within the borders of Jamaica.

In this essay the nature and threat of organised crime and its development in Jamaica are described and the conditions and structural features that have facilitated this

development identified. Organised crime is distinguished by the nature of its relationships to the upper-world. The essay thus describes its penetration of the political system and its relationship to official corruption, that is, its implications for good governance. On the basis of this analysis, the approaches that have adopted in dealing with organised crime are discussed.

The upper-world relationships of organised crime extend beyond the political institutions and parts of the state bureaucracy.¹ A similar effort therefore ought to be made to explore the linkages to critical economic institutions and particularly the financial system but this requires a more comprehensive treatment than is attempted here. The historical processes that have incubated organised crime are of considerable importance for understanding its development, but in this essay, mainly the political dimensions of this history are tentatively explored. The picture that is presented here is thus partial.

Here it is argued that the emergence, prominence and power of organised crime represent a transformation of criminality in Jamaica that has taken place over the last two decades. To the extent that organised crime may be regarded as a transforming force, it is a force for a more robust criminality (self-transforming), for further depletion in the already low levels of social capital by undermining trust within the general population, and for poor governance. It has deep structural roots that are internal to Jamaican society such as the relatively large marginalized populations of the urban areas that are largely excluded from the employed labour force, the even larger sections the general population that are to different degrees blocked from engagement in meaningful entrepreneurial

¹ A large informal sector and endemic corruption blurs the boundaries between the “upper world ” and the underworld” but the distinction is nevertheless real and useful.

activity; and the methods of political mobilisation and integration of the urban poor into the political system (as is for example expressed in the garrison phenomenon). External conditions have also contributed to its rise particularly the opportunities presented by the growth of the illicit drug markets in North America. Some of these factors and the processes attending them generally explain the high levels of violent crimes and the processes that eventually gave rise to organized crime. Jamaican organised crime emerged and flourished in a context of high levels of violent crime, weak law enforcement, high levels of state corruption, access to the international drug markets and subcultural tolerance of some categories of crime particularly entrepreneurial forms such as ganja (*cannabis sativa*) trafficking.

THE THREAT OF ORGANISED CRIME

This rise of organised crime (OC) is illustrated by the career of the Clansman network. Originating in one of the garrison communities of the city of Spanish Town, Jamaica's first capital, the Clan is one of the better known and more powerful groups.² Like so many other networks, it has spawned affiliate groups in other towns.

On October 30, 2005, Donovan Bennett (known as Bulbie), the leader of the Clan was killed by the police at one of his homes. He had successfully evaded the police for some ten years while his network operated openly. His death triggered mass protests that succeeded in shutting down the Old Capital, which in 2001 had a population of approximately 131,500.³ The protests forced the closure of places of business and

² The concept of the garrison is elaborate later in the text.

³ See *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica* 2004.

schools, blocked the main roadways, and brought public transportation within and through the city to a halt.

The power to shut down the city was based on the group's demonstrated capacity and will to engage in large scale violence, the popular support that it commands in the communities of the poor and its penetration of critical sectors of the local economy. For example, its particularly powerful hold on public transportation via control of the major transportation centres, ownership of some of the transportation stocks and an extortionist relationship with the independent taxi and bus operators allows it to quite easily shut down this vital sector on which other economic and social activity turns. Moreover, the reputation of these groups for engaging in open violence between themselves and with the security forces is such that the shooting death of one of their leaders is sufficient reason for citizens to stay home in anticipation of retaliatory violence.

These protests were an interesting show of political influence and social power. A target of the protestors was the Minister of National Security the Hon. Peter Phillips who was denounced for ending Bennett's immunity and was labeled a traitor to the ruling party (for failing to deflect the gaze of law enforcement away from the activities of highly valued party affiliated criminals). The protestors called for his removal as Minister of National Security.⁴ This theme was to be repeated when another leader of organised crime, Donald Phipps, who was also affiliated to the ruling party, was arrested and later convicted for murder.⁵ These developments occurred in the context of a competitive election for a new party President and Prime Minister of the country. Phillips

⁴ See *Daily Gleaner* November 6, 2005.

⁵ Donald Phipps (Zeeks) was convicted for murder in April 2006

was a candidate in this electoral contest and organised crime sought to exploit the moment to leverage its political influence.

Bennett's funeral was attended by thousands of persons of all ages. The support of the people from the home community of the Clansmen was evident. According to a middle-aged man who was in attendance and who was animatedly contending with the police officers who were present, "dis a fi wi thing."⁶ This expression indicated a complete identification with Bennett and his Clansmen and open unapologetic ownership of this type of criminal enterprise. Bennett was a "don", a new breed of violent criminal entrepreneurs who symbolise a new found power and influence. Some members of the communities that are dominated by the group, but which also benefit from its patronage and protection, interpret this as *their* power and influence (and in some sense it is). In Jamaica, organized crime is anchored in a larger subculture and tradition of subverting legal authority.⁷

These "dons" symbolise the transformation of crime that has occurred - a transformation that was facilitated by exploiting the major international markets in drugs and the opportunities presented by state corruption and political sponsorship. At the time of his death the police estimated the value of Bennett's personal wealth to be approximately J\$100 million.⁸ This seems to be quite modest when compared with the net worth of some of the other known criminal entrepreneurs. This sum appeared to be simply an estimate of the value of his personal property and would represent an

⁶ This translates roughly as "This is our thing." The description is striking not just because of how it represents the relationship between the community and organised crime, but also because of the choice of words. Translated into Italian it reads *costra nostra*. These observations are taken from the authors field notebook for a larger research project on homicides in Jamaica.

⁷ The point is elaborated in a study of homicide which will be completed shortly.

⁸ See the *Sunday Observer* 20\11\2005 page 1.

underestimation of his wealth as it did not take into account the value of his legal and illegal businesses.

The above highlights five critical aspects of organised crime. These are its treatment of crime as enterprise or business activity, the extension of these activities from the underground to the formal economy via various linkages and partnerships, its social support among the people, its political engagement and influence, and its use of managed violence to achieve its objectives. The protests were exhibitions of its economic, social and political power.

For these and other reasons, the *National Security Strategy* of the Government of Jamaica (NSS) identifies it as a major “crime-related” threat to the country (see MNS 2005). Presumably there are other types of major threats of a more political nature such as international terrorism.⁹ Organised crime does not present a strategic challenge to the state. It may establish its own quasi-governmental administration in some localities and it may have the capability to violently disrupt social activity, inflict considerable harm on the economy, and to even make political demands on the government but it does not contest for control of the political administration as an independent force that is external to the political system.¹⁰ It rather tends to influence the political process *from within* as a part of the existing circuits of power. Even street protests such as the “Bulbie demonstrations” described above are intended to amplify its internal influence. Such actions may hasten meetings with the Member of Parliament and ensure that their

⁹ See the *National Security Strategy 2005* page 5-16.

¹⁰ It has been argued that organized crime may assist the activity of international terrorist groups – if the price is right. The logic of this reasoning is however not very cogent. Any such alliance would do irreparable damage to organized crime, its political links, its reputation in the international markets as anti-American and would precipitate more robust international law enforcement cooperation against it. See Bagley 2003 for a discussion of this issue.

concerns are thereby filtered into the internal decision-making process of the parties and government.

In Jamaica, organised crime thus corrodes the political system from within. Although in other national contexts, organised crime may have evolved from prison alliances between ordinary criminals and repressed anti-system oppositionist political groupings as was the case with the Thieves World in the former USSR (Volkov 2002: 54-59) and some OC groupings in Brazil during the period of military dictatorships (...), or may have been mobilized by these movements as was the case in China during the anti-communist campaign of the nationalist Kuo Min Tang (see Liu 2001: 27-31), it has presented no political challenge to democratic *regimes*. It may seek to influence policies that adversely affect its interests by the resort to terrorism, as was the case in Colombia, but this must be distinguished from attempts to effect regime change or even to supplant an administration. In some cases, such as in Southern Italy, some organised crime groupings may have had their antecedents in social banditry, but in contemporary Jamaica, it is not to be mistaken for this phenomenon and as being ideologically driven to challenge the state and the social order and as seeking to redistribute wealth to the urban poor.¹¹ It provides some benefits to the poor, such as making loans to street vendors, but this is typically done in ways that incorporate them into the criminal enterprise. For example, organized crime may provide funds to these vendors that are received abroad and used to purchase goods for importation into Jamaica. On the sale of the goods locally, the soft loans are then repaid in Jamaican currency. Although they may *appear* to be helpful to the poor, they are certainly not anti-system “subaltern movements.” The

¹¹ “Social banditry” is quite distinct from anti-social organised crime but Blok (1988:99-102) describes the pathways of “upward mobility” in 19th century southern Italy by which the former may have evolved into the latter. **

leaders of these networks typically wish to acquire huge personal fortunes, status, power and political influence. In the process they ruthlessly control the lives of the people who live in the communities that are dominated by them and in some instances have set up local tyrannies using totalitarian methods of administration.

There are thus different faces to organized crime. It is capable of being violently disruptive and confrontational in its conflicts with the state and yet plays an active role in the maintenance of the existing social and political relationships. With regard to its role in system maintenance, for example, impressionistic evidence suggests that the place of women in the Jamaican underground economy is more unequal and limiting than it is in the formal economy and the mainstream of society. This is certainly true of the drug trade where women are largely confined to high-risk-low-reward roles such as that of transnational couriers. Similarly with regard to its politics, organized crime remains closely linked to the political system and is an institutional actor that helps to integrate the urban poor into the system and to bolster party control and to erect and maintain one-party monopolies in the communities.

Permeation of the Political System

This relationship to the political mainstream indicates that the system itself has a latent capacity for political degeneration. Degeneration has been occurring and could continue to occur, for example, via a slow process of increasing the number of garrison constituencies thereby making the system more politically monopolistic on a constituency by constituency basis.¹² Some 13-20% of all constituencies and 40% of all urban

¹² Figueroa (1994) has already alerted us to this prospect. His conclusions are based on his analysis of the patterns of garrison voting.

constituencies have already been garrisoned.¹³ By this process, the danger to democracy that is presented by the organised crime-politics coalition is always seen as local. However, beyond its local “jurisdictions”, organised crime has already played a role in violently crushing street protests,¹⁴ and in a few cases, intimidating journalists and public figures who may be critical of “their” government¹⁵ or, as will be discussed below, their party Leader.

Changes in the dominant coalition within a ruling party that favour the personalities, groupings and social forces that rely most on street politics and corrupt methods of rule could further reinforce and indeed extend these kinds of developments to the point of silencing dissenting voices within their own parties and among the general public. Pernel Charles, a member of parliament, former Minister of Government and former deputy leader of the JLP may credibly claim to have been a victim of physical attacks and intimidation by members of party affiliated organised crime networks. **These attacks occurred in 1991\2? when he was a prominent critic of the Leader of his Party. He and his supporters were forced to hastily retreat from a party conference at which it was expected that he would have contested for the post of Party Leader or in other ways “embarrassed”, or in the language of the gangsters, “disrespected” the party leader.¹⁶ (INTERVIEW PERNEL\SEE DG).** In other words, leadership of such a degenerative

¹³ The two figures given are calculations based on different definitions of the garrison. The later figure is derived using Figueroa’s operational definition which takes a pattern of homogenous voting as the definiens. This definition is open to the contention that a pattern of homogenous voting may be produced in different ways. A conceptual definition that considers the garrison a mode of political administration in which criminal networks, usually OC, form a part of the dominant coalition and are fully integrated into the party structures, accounts for the lower figure in the range. This idea is elaborated later in this chapter.

¹⁴ This has already occurred in the case of the Opposition protests against the proposed gas price increases which were held in 1999.

¹⁵ Personal communication with the author. There have been at least two such cases in recent times.

¹⁶ In the world of organised crime “disrespectful” behaviour warrants a violent response. And as democracy is not a value, a democratic challenge may be considered simply a challenge and thus disrespectful. **Pernel Charles to be interviewed.**

process must come from sections of the political elite; organized crime is simply a willing, able, experienced and self-interested assistant.

Changes in the dominant coalition within a party may be effected in various ways but would involve OC playing an increasingly important role in the internal politics of the party and in national elections, that is, by progressively increasing its influence within and degree of control over the political process. This process typically begins with local influence – which is most evident in the garrison communities. There, they are able to determine key outcomes, and in some cases may even have veto power over major party decisions such as those to do with candidate selection in local government elections. Such political influence is derived from social support within the communities. From their community base, the more powerful entrepreneurial groups are then able to extend their influence to the constituency level where they may exercise a degree of control over the party machinery so that they are able to determine or at least influence candidate selection at the constituency level. Candidates may be coopted via funding arrangements and may even be out-manuevered by Dons who are part of contending party coalitions at the national level. On this basis, some leaders of OC networks may become a force in national party affairs and exercise influence over other public processes (including contracts and resource allocation). In turn a feedback effect may develop whereby, party dependence on corrupt funding serves to reinforce the influence of organised crime within the party structures. Deep inter-dependences are developed. Organised crime may further enhance its influence by the process of funding a party and or party candidates in conditions where the prospects for alternate funding streams are limited such as when the economic elites who normally provide the lion's share of campaign funds leave the

coalition that is led by a particular party and turn against it. This forces the party to rely more on illegal funding sources. Such a development may signify a shift in the social base of such a coalition. Elements of OC may thus become part of the dominant coalition within the funding dependent party. Such an outcome would not be irreversible. Changes in the political fortunes of the party and of OC may be expected to lead to internal realignments. However this process of empowerment is associated with the maturity of OC. It is a process whereby politics is “criminalized” and criminality easily politicized as a protective strategy.

Organised Crime - The Motor of Violent Crimes

Although it does not directly challenge the state, organised crime nevertheless presents one of the greatest challenges facing the country since Independence. It has become the motor of Jamaica’s crime problem for the following reasons. First, it serves to advertise the success of crime including violent crime. Its leaders have become highly visible models of material success and perhaps social success more generally. Jamaica now has “super Dons” whose personal assets are valued at hundreds of millions of dollars. Their success is evident in the open displays of opulence such as the ownership of mansions that are fitted with all sorts of expensive and eye-catching but aesthetically tasteless features such as gilded stairways, fleets of SUVs, and exhibitionist displays of consumerist free spending. Importantly, is also manifested in their access to seemingly unlimited numbers of attractive women, and perhaps more importantly in their social and political influence. Wealth, pleasure, status and power are the desired values.

That they may be acquired by criminal means is profoundly subversive of the social order in profoundly social ways. This particularly true of status acquisition which was formerly the only primary social good (among those listed above) that could not be purchased with criminally acquired wealth. Status acquisition was wedded to the means used to acquire the other goods, to valued service to the society, that is, to adherence or at least visible adherence to conventional norms.¹⁷ Thus white-collar criminals could acquire status and respectability if, their illicit activity was undetected, but violent and highly visible street criminals could not do so. The extent of tolerance of innovative means (gray and illegal) and the diffusion of subcultural norms have however eroded the significance placed on means related conduct norms. Criminally acquired wealth has thus acquired greater **fungibility**. The primacy of money as a value (and the unhinging of law), and the success of OC via its bridging relationships to the upperworld of powerful high status actors (including very public association with members of the political elite) have undermined this social restraint or limit on criminality.

Second, it has made a successful business of violence. The lucrative extortion racket is an example of this as it allows the networks to cash in on their reputations for violence. It motivates and encourages copy-cat extortionists who must now establish the credibility of their claims and thus engage in reputation-building violence. Violence thereby becomes more prevalent – as a strategy for success in building a criminal career.

Third, it commands considerable means of violence. The major networks are thus able to destabilize the society when engaged in “wars” among themselves and confrontations with the Security Forces.

¹⁷ I exclude the ascriptive statuses.

Fourth, organised crime networks have been able to use their criminally acquired wealth to corrupt some of the key institutions of the country including the police force,¹⁸ elements in the state bureaucracy and the political parties. Official involvement in partnerships with organised crime gives elements in the political administration and the state bureaucracy an interest in blocking cardinal principles of good governance such as accountability and transparency.

Fifth, it has set up and maintains defensible territory, that is, safe havens that give it near immunity from police action. Entry of these areas by the police may precipitate armed battles that are costly in lives lost, and may be politically costly for the police and the political administration. By increasing these costs to law enforcement and the political administration, the garrisons ensure their near complete **immunity, and security as criminal safe-havens.**

Finally, its embeddedness in larger networks of national influence, especially its influence in the political parties is particularly threatening. This presents the country with the prospect of legislators being sent to the parliament who are indebted to the crime networks and who may frustrate efforts to pass legislation to effectively deal with organised crime and who may use their influence to weaken the police services and anti-corruption agencies (via resources allocations, undermine the merit principle, impose a compliant leadership and other methods). In 2001, the then Minister of National Security and Justice the Hon K.D. Knight warned that this prospect was real.¹⁹

¹⁸ For a discussion of the extent of corruption in the police force, see the speech by the Commissioner of police at the Annual Meeting of the Police Federation in 2005. It was reported in the *Daily Gleaner* June 6, 2005.

¹⁹ See *Daily Gleaner* of October 25, 2001

This idea that organised crime has become the main security threat to the society was not always accepted. In the late 1990s, new programmes in the then Ministry of National Security and Justice were still largely based on the idea that “domestic violence” was the most prevalent and problematic form of homicidal violence and the main crime-related problem. This construction of the problem served the interests of the police well (they argued that such killings were not preventable by police action so they should not be held to account) and was informed by police data which erroneously categorized all forms of inter-personal violence as “domestic violence.” A mediation unit was consequently set up in the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) for treating with domestic violence. This was badly needed, but was unlikely to have and indeed has not had an impact on the homicide problem. Later, there was a better appreciation of the problem, but this was then specified as “gang” violence, with little distinction being made between youth gangs and organised crime. This assessment in part led to the formation of the Peace Management Initiative (PMI) which has had some success in pacifying youth gangs and done much useful work to bring peace to some of the embattled communities but has made little impression on the country’s homicide rate.²⁰

In Jamaican society, there is an aversion, or at least considerable impatience with any attempt to study the crime problem. There is an understandable demand for action and studies are regarded as an excuse for inaction on the part of the state. And yet the knowledge gaps are so great that they permit politically convenient constructions of the problem that allow the authorities to evade accountability for non-performance.²¹

²⁰ For a rather generous review of the performance of the PMI, see *The Peace Management Initiative Jamaica*. In South-South Regional Cooperation for Determining Best Practices for Crime Prevention in the Developing World. 2006. page 108-127.

²¹ This is for example the first essay on the activities of Jamaican organised crime within Jamaica.

The failure to understand the crime problem does also have very practical negative consequences as have occurred when mediation and peace-making strategies are applied to conflicts involving organized crime networks. The most obvious example of this was the attempt to negotiate peace between the One Order and Clansman groupings. These negotiations, which occurred in 2005, were brought to public attention when a member of the One Order group was murdered while he was traveling in a motor car with the Member of Parliament (MP) Ms. Olivia Grange.²² They were both returning from peace negotiations that had the approval of the police.²³ The process, and the killing in particular, revealed the protective nature of the relationship between the political parties and organised crime, symbolised the weakness of the police and the power of the organised crime networks.

One outcome of this was that the two MPs who were involved in the “peace” negotiations (one from each of the two major political parties) were forced to justify their involvement in the process. In so doing, the logic of political self-preservation led to a misrepresentation of organised crime and the nature of the violence they were involved in as conflicts that are occasioned by personal and “domestic” matters or even seemingly noble causes such as the “defence” of their communities [FOOTNOTE NEEDED]. At worst, the violent activities of the new phenomenon of organised crime are interpreted as simply the intensification of old patterns of youth gang and party competitive behaviour. Such representations of organised crime by highly placed members of the political elite may be expected to have the effect of demobilizing the society and law enforcement.

²² See *Daily Gleaner* October 7, 2005.

²³ See “I Want Proof” by Tyrone Reid in the *Daily Gleaner* November 2, 2005.

It was not until the mid-1990s, after its transnational character had become evident, that the Jamaican police began to name the phenomenon as organised crime. In 1997 an Organised Crime Unit was established within the police force.²⁴ Thereafter, the JCF then began in practice to distinguish more clearly between organised crime and ordinary gangs. Nevertheless there is still some confusion about the nature of the phenomenon.

HIGHER LEVEL HEADING?

Organised Crime Defined

Popular notions of organised crime tend to highlight its *organizational features*, that is, the degree of structural complexity and formalization (see Albanese and Das 2003:4-5; Zhang 1992). There are three **aspects to this**: the existence of a clear division of labour, that is, specialization by functions and roles; a hierarchical order or command structure that distinguishes operatives from those who make critical decisions; and “spatial dispersion”, that is, the extent to which the organisation or network is distributed across space and thus has to engage in complex coordination. From this perspective, group characteristics such as the age range of members (extending beyond youth) and their occupations, (for example, the inclusion of lawyers, chemists, police officers, financial advisors, politicians and other “professionals”) may also be regarded as defining features.

Organisation and group characteristics are considered to be important as they signify the durability of these networks. The age range of member, for example suggests that they tend to be involved in life-course-persistent criminal behavior, and the general organizational characteristics of organised crime networks suggests that unlike youth

²⁴ Personal correspondence with a senior officer. June 2006.

gangs, these networks are unlikely to easily and quickly wither away. These characteristics also determine the *scale* of operations that are possible and which enable crime networks to engage in the more lucrative types of crime. The organizational features are thus bound up with the activities of organized crime; the former sets the limits of the later.

Using these formal organizational features as the defining characteristics, doubt has been cast on whether Jamaican crime networks, including the most successful transnational networks that are engaged in drug-related criminal enterprises, are really organized crime or “disorganized crime.”²⁵ Such was the level of confusion among foreign law enforcement officials and researchers in the early 1990s that the Jamaican networks that were operating in the USA were then even described as “organized-disorganized crime.”²⁶

Descriptions of organizational features including hierarchy are important for elaborating policing strategy. If one wishes to destroy a criminal firm, knowing the chain of command, information pathways, and the critical roles are very important. The centrality of formal organizational features in this type of thinking is thus understandable. Some networks have become much more structurally complex since the early 1990s when these characterizations were made, but even if the complexities are grasped, this would nevertheless remain a one-dimensional depiction of organised crime.

²⁵ See for example “The Yardies: England’s Emerging Crime Problem.” By Roy Ramm, Detective Chief Superintendent, International and Organised Crime Branch, Scotland Yard.
www.textfiles.com/law/yardies.text.

²⁶ On the face of it, this term could also be read as an attempt to grapple with the complexities of the Jamaican networks but there is not much in the written record to support this idea. It was not a debate about its flexibility, adaptability and complexity of its relationships but rather of its relative lack of sophistication (when for example, compared with American organized crime). In other words, it reflects a kind of structural formalism and the confusion that follows from it.

Others treat the nature of its *activity*, or rather activity and organization as the defining features of organized crime (see Shigui 1992; Kennedy and Finckenhauer 1994). Its motivation and activity are seen as being exclusively fixed on material gain. From this perspective, organised crime is enterprise crime. Although ordinary predatory criminal activity is also largely aimed at material gain, it is not enterprise. Ordinary predatory criminality does not have a market orientation and does not engage in the provision of services. Relative to organised crime it thus has considerable limitations. Robbery, for example, usually involves great risk in order to access large sums (although forms such as computer fraud and corporate crimes now make access to large sums possible –but these are not street crimes). In contrast, the supply of illicit goods and services tends to yield much higher and recurring returns. This applies to the exploitation of large global markets in illegal drugs, the provision of protective, sexual and other services. Organised crime networks are able to generate the demand for some of these services. For example, crime creates the demand for security and protection which the organised crime networks in turn supply. Moreover, they are able to provide these services (in the local markets) at relatively low risk when compared with the activities of ordinary predatory criminality.

These types of activity tend to stimulate organizational complexity and flexibility. This is especially true for those activities that are transnational and involve operating in international drugs and arms markets where they are faced with pressures from effective police services and enjoy more limited community support. Even local extortion rackets may require support services, such as book-keeping, and thus the recruitment of members with the needed competences.

Legalistic definitions tend to take this tact, that is, highlight the activities and organizational features of organised crime. An example of this is the INTERPOL definition which was adopted by its General Assembly in 1998. These features are also captured by Albanese in the following definition:

Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are often in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials. (Albanese 2004: 10)

He specifies the activities and methods of organised crime. This perspective on organized crime is however too exclusive. As von Lampe notes, it excludes significant aspects of organized crime such as predatory activity that has no market orientation and “quasi-governmental or parasitic power syndicates.” (von Lampe 2003:10). The above definition, while correct in emphasizing the relationship of organized crime to the market, regards it as having one motive, that is, profit-making. This is perhaps a generalization from the American experience. However, as will be discussed later, there is also a power motive and strong status strivings, that is, a non-enterprise aspect to organised crime.

Exclusive focus on the profit motive limits understanding of the phenomenon. For example, such an understanding cannot adequately explain the territoriality of Jamaican organised crime. This would have to be regarded as an irrationality and/or a hangover from its past of political thuggery. It is power, and particularly its expression in territoriality, why organized crime has developed such a tight and comfortable

relationship with the political system and the parties; not just with individual corrupt politicians with strong pecuniary drives. The power motive also helps to explain why the webs of criminally exploitable ties are so broad and so successfully upward reaching.

Its structural complexity and enterprise character are important aspects of organised crime, but perhaps the most conceptually insightful defining principle is its relationships - especially its relationships with the upper world. In the Jamaican context, what characterizes organised crime, and clearly distinguishes it from other categories of crime is the nature of *its relationship to power and to key institutions*. Organised crime brings the underworld into a mutually beneficial corrupt relationship with powerful legitimate actors and institutions. It is rooted in webs of “criminally exploitable” relationships. This is what makes it so corrupting and dangerous.

The relationships that constitute and facilitate the activities of organised crime are governed by implicit and explicit rules. A code of silence is one such rule. In the Jamaican case, as in Italy where organised crime was\is grounded in a broad set of relationships and community norms, this rule is accepted or at least adhered to in these wider relationships. In other words, in the Jamaican context, some of these codes find reinforcement in a subculture where there is considerable alienation from the state. This alienation and subcultural formation in turn explains the expanded political space within which the quasi-governmental activities of organised crime find approval. In its territorial domain, organised crime engages in rule-making and rule-enforcement. Indeed some territorially based networks have developed very elaborate systems of rule-enforcement that apply not just to the members of the network but also to the entire communities in which they operate. These are the “Jungle courts” of Kingston’s inner-

city communities where residents may be tried and punished for various violations.²⁷ Infractions range from fraudulently presenting themselves as agents of the networks who are assigned to collect extortion fees, to rape (within the community), physical abuse of one's partner, and child neglect. The governmental functions that have been usurped by organized crime include policing, justice administration, and the provision of welfare services such as food aid and early childhood education. While these activities yield considerable benefits to the enterprise and profit-making endeavours of the networks, for example, tales of the recovery of property stolen from a poor market vendor is good advertising for protection racketeering, they also highlight the power motives of these groups.²⁸

Cressey's definition of organized crime, although written in 1969, succinctly encapsulates the essential elements of a good conceptual definition of the phenomenon, that is, the activity, organization, relationships and means used. Unlike most of the other definitions, it takes the definiendum as the act rather than the entity that commits the act.

An organized crime is any crime committed by a person occupying, in an established division of labor, a position designed for the commission of crime providing that such division of labor also includes at least one position for a corrupter, one position for a corruptee, and one position for an enforcer (Cressey 1969:319 cited in Abadinsky 1990:3)

²⁷ Inner-city may be regarded as a term borrowed from social ecology. It is used here simply to avoid using the word ghetto which is usually taken as a stigmatizing epithet.

²⁸ Tales of their "good works" and the celerity and efficiency of their policing methods are periodically reported on national radio via the talk show programmes.

Organised crime networks thus contrasts with youth gangs and groups of ordinary criminals. These latter groupings, particularly youth gangs, tend to emerge spontaneously from the everyday interaction of young people in conditions of high population density, high levels of youth unemployment, high household density, weak family support systems, and intense street life that plays an important role in the socialization of adolescents. As Tresher (1927) has pointed out, their “most rudimentary form of collective behaviour is interstimulation”, that is, the rehearsal of adventure including sexual adventure and violent conflicts. In the Jamaican context, these groupings seek to control space (their “corner” or “ends”), develop a group solidarity and identity, and to collectively participate in mainly non-criminal activity. Some of these activities, to the extent that they involve movement through space, for example, to attend dances, may bring them into conflict with similar groups. Such conflicts are usually over intangibles including identity issues and simply being in the territory of another group, but may also be over girls and at times over guns. Individual members of these groups may engage in predatory crimes but the group is not formed for this purpose. Such gangs are usually called “crews” to distinguish them from groups whose *raison d’être* is crime as is the case with organised crime networks.²⁹

ITS FEATURES DESCRIBED

We may now employ these definitional insights to analyse the nature of organised crime in Jamaica with emphasis on its activities, relationships and means used to achieve its objectives.

²⁹ For a discussion of corner crews in Jamaica, see Levy 2005.

Activities

Jamaican organised crime is involved in a widening range of illegal and legal activities. Some of these illegal activities within Jamaica's borders are noted above and includes: enterprise crimes such as drug trafficking and pornographic productions, that is, the supply of goods; prostitution, that is, the supply of services; and extortion and protection rackets, that is the supply of violence related services; and environmental crimes such as illegal sand-mining. Its seemingly legal activities include construction, trucking, solid-waste disposal and related services, hotel services, entertainment, motor vehicle parking and financing or informal banking. These lists are far from exhaustive. Josephs provides a similar description of some of their activities in the USA (see Josephs 1999).

Differences in the activities of different OC networks indicate that the differentiation in network type that is occurring. Developments in the construction sector of the economy illustrate this. Some of the more entrepreneurial OC groups that are concerned with laundering criminally acquired funds and developing legitimate businesses have formed construction firms and are exploiting their relationship with state actors to secure contracts, are establishing private sector partnerships, and delivering legal goods and services. That they are OC affiliated firms gives them advantages. They may avoid extortion rents and labour problems such a work stoppages that delay job completion. On the other hand those, networks that are specialists in violence intimidate construction companies to employ affiliates of these crime networks, and force the companies to assign these workers to types of work and to award them rates of pay that are not commensurate with their competences. For example, unskilled workers may be

employed as masons with obvious consequences for the quality of work done. These OC “firms” then “tax” or extort the workers as a return on their ‘job placement” service. This involves simply cashing in on their reputations for violence. They may even extend their targets to the first type of OC networks often precipitating violence.

The above differentiation is however not always very clear. The older territorially based patron-client networks are becoming increasingly involved in the full range of illegal services including activities such as north coast prostitution which hithertofore were largely left to free individual operators. These are full service providers or criminal conglomerates that are able to protect their own enterprise operations and also engage in predatory activity such as extortion rackets. New and more corporate networks are opening up non-traditional fields such as real estate rackets that target victims across the globe via internet marketing. These latter types are vulnerable to the more powerful and more violent predatory networks who may begin by extorting them but may later take over partially or in full some of their “businesses.”

Drug-trafficking to and distribution in the drug retail markets of North America and Europe however provided the main impetus for the development of organised crime and gave it a services and market orientation.³⁰ Penetration of the international drug markets helped to transform territorially based groupings of gangsters and political thugs into organised crime networks. Once entry into the retail trade was established, Jamaican networks sought to diversify their product offerings to include the distribution of Colombian cocaine. American agencies estimate that in the year 2000, some 100-120

³⁰ The grouping that became organized crime networks were never even involved in the local retail trade in ganja. This was left to individual “hustlers.”

metric tones of cocaine valued at \$US 4-to 4.5 billion were transshipped to the US via Jamaica.³¹

Jamaican organised crime networks have become truly transnational. In this regard they are not particularly exceptional. They were simply one set of actors in a larger global process. As others have argued, the process of globalization has facilitated the transnational activity of organised crime networks (see Findlay 1999). Increased movement of goods and people has been accompanied by increased illicit trade. Illicit goods travel through similar channels as licit goods. Corrupt practices associated with the trade in licit goods such as the evasion of customs duties thus provide channels for the smuggling of illicit goods. Jamaica is an open trading economy. Its major trading partner is the US with its large drug and firearm markets.

Jamaica has a relatively large diaspora that is settled in these countries. The criminal networks have been able to insert themselves into the communities where Black and other minority migrant populations are concentrated, and where the social conditions that favour their activities and organizational growth may be found. Bowling and Phillips (2006) provides an excellent analytic description of these conditions in the UK and Wilson (1996), and the ethnographies of Anderson (see 1990) are similarly useful for understanding these conditions as the outcome of enduring racial inequalities in the US.

As noted elsewhere (Harriott 2006), the violent activities of these networks in the US and the UK have earned them considerable notoriety and harmed the image of the Jamaican people. This is not peculiar to the Jamaican networks. Other nationalities have

³¹ This is possibly an overestimate, but even if it is a gross overestimate, it suggests that the reality is truly problematic. These data were reported by the Minister of National Security, Dr. Peter Phillips, in a speech at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus, and which was subsequently published in *Jamaica The Way Forward – Presentations at the Political Leadership Forum 2005*. Kingston: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies. 2006.

been similarly stereotyped as violent and criminal. In the early 20th century, Italians were described by the American press as “cruel, treacherous, vindictive and violent” (see Repetto 2004:xi) and at the end of the century, Russians were similarly described. American journalistic and academic writings in particular have tended to explain the existence and activity of various organised crime networks in terms of race, ethnicity and nationality (see Kleinknecht 1996). Given their race perspectives on crime, Jamaican crime thus implicates not just all Jamaicans but all Blacks. Moreover, in the case of Jamaican crime in the US, it is foreign, violent and therefore in the context of strong anti-migration sentiments, would seem to be particularly threatening.³²

The accumulation of large sums from its activities abroad has facilitated a transformation of the activities of these groups in Jamaica. Their entry into new types of seemingly legitimate business activity and money laundering agreements with established firms, have helped them to set up the relationships that make an even wider range of activities possible.

Counter-measures against Jamaican crime networks in the US and the UK may have hastened the efforts to develop their business interests and rackets in Jamaica. By the mid-1990s, many of the leaders and operatives in the larger transnational Jamaican networks were either in US prisons or had been deported to Jamaica. Later there were similar law enforcement efforts in the UK – with similar results. The operation of organised crime in Jamaica seemed to have flourished after the mid-1990s with the extortion rackets blossoming towards the end of the 1990s. A survey of 400 firms revealed that in 2002, approximately 5% of them were regularly paying protection or

³² For a discussion of the violence of these networks in the US see the essay *The Jamaican Posses in America: An Emergent Force in US Organised Crime* by Bernard Headley in this volume.

extortion fees (see Francis et. al. 2003). The networks were beginning to put a stranglehold on urban based business especially in construction, transportation, the retail trade in haberdashery, and manufacturing. New rackets were emerging and old rackets were being done in new ways, on a new scale, and with greater success.

Extortion and protection rackets have become a major source of income and power for the organised crime networks. It is generally understood that there is an important distinction between these two types of crimes. Extortion is essentially a predatory crime and involves the demand for payments in return for protection from the danger that the person or group that demands the payments presents. Protection rackets on the other hand, are more of an enterprise crime. Payments are demanded in return for the provision of services that protect the victim from others who may present a criminal threat. Unlike with extortion, the source of the danger and the source of the protective service are different. Although the contract between the service provider and the victim is an involuntary one, and the price is fixed under the threat of violence, some value is thus added. Both extortion and protection involve the use of a credible threat of violence, but the seemingly more benign protection racketeer must be able to deliver it against both his “client” and potential predators. Protection services may therefore easily evolve into extortion rackets.

These rackets have revolutionized crime in Jamaica. Unlike drugs, they produce regular income and at relatively low risk. Consequently the Dons are able to pay salaries to the members of their networks. Crime has thus become a regular full-time occupation with a reliable income. These networks are also able to make regular contributions to various community projects and to transform them into programmes that strengthen their

support base. There are now two clear features of the more developed criminal networks in the country. These are professionalization and a quasi-governmental engagement. The latter involves the provision of welfare and other services such as banking, early childhood education and policing. Welfare and protective activity yields strong community support and a benign image. It helps to build the relationships that nurture and empower organised crime. **Especially its violent predatory variety that is more akin to what is understood as mafia.**³³

The Relationships and Method

As is hinted above there are basically two “models” of organised crime. These are the entrepreneurial and the predatory forms that may operate using corporate and the patron-client methods. **The former classificatory principle emphasizes the activities, and the latter, the organizational features and methods. Both are useful principles of classification especially when used together. Entrepreneurial networks that are not territorially based may be expected to evolve in a more corporate direction while the predatory territorially based networks tend to use patron-client methods to cement their relationships to the communities in which they are based and are more likely to evolve into community gatekeepers and extortionists, that is, a special variety of OC who make a business of violence including providing violence related services to the political parties (such as purging territory of persons affiliated to the opposing party and voter intimidation).** **WATCH FOR REPETITION BELOW.** The different organizational forms signify the

³³ By mafia is not mean the culturally specific form of organised crime that is native to Sicily but rather a generic type that may be found in a variety of setting as a kind of violent entrepreneur or supplier of violent services that further distinguishes itself from ordinary predatory criminal networks by its relationship to mainstream state and political actors.

differences in the nature of the larger set of relationships that they are entwined in or suffused with. At the risk of overdrawing the distinctions, the corporate model is a pattern of organization that approximates the formal structures of a corporation or firm with clear notions of ownership, a more or less formal hierarchy, and employer-employee type relationships (see Abadinsky 1990). The patron-client model, on the other hand, is based on chains of personalized relations, hierarchies ordered on the “principle” of proximity to the leader (inner circles and outer circles), role and status hierarchies that are derived from this, reciprocities, and overt political relationships that are all formed in the context of a community or some territorial unit. Such organised crime groupings are a part of sets of networks that seek to “convert the state into a source of patronage and material rewards for individuals.”³⁴ Their influence in these criminally exploitable networks have historically been based on their ability to determine the margins of victory in local electoral contests using force and fraud – in a context of already existing majority support for the parties.

Jamaican organised crime typically adopts the patron-client model.³⁵ Its success is based on two sets of relationships. These are its relationship with the communities of the urban poor, and with the main political parties. All other relationships that make both enterprise and high-reward-low-risk predatory crimes possible are built on these two foundational relationships.

Relationship to\with the communities of the urban poor

³⁴ These words are taken from Stone (1980:92). He used them to describe the mobilisational methodology of the political parties, not organized crime.

³⁵ There are some significant exceptions. The point elaborated in a larger work that is currently in progress.

Most Jamaican organised crime networks tend to be territorially based and are rooted in the communities of the urban poor in the sense that they belong to these communities and their ties to them are organic and multi-faceted. This is where they emerged as street gangs. As these communities became politically mobilized and politically homogenous, the resident gangs became party affiliated actors in this process.

The social conditions in these communities are characterized by high rates of poverty, high rates of youth unemployment, poor housing including high household density, weak familial relations, over-representation of young people in their population structure and high levels of violence. Between 1990 and 2002, poverty levels in the country ranged between 28% and 16%.³⁶ Urban poverty rates have tended to be lower than rural rates, however, the high violence communities of the urban poor all have very high levels of poverty. In some of these communities, such as those of Central Kingston, the estimated level of unemployment is 70% much of this being long-term or chronic unemployment.³⁷ In others, the levels of unemployment are considerably lower, but the rates of underemployment are high. Anderson et. al.(2004) has mapped housing conditions in a number of Kingston's inner city communities. Their research revealed that in some of these communities in Western Kingston, while the average household size was not particularly high, household density was very high. In Denham Town, for example, there was an average of 2.64 persons per room, and when the single person households were excluded from the analysis the mean number of persons per room was 3.24 (Anderson et. al. 2004: 33-35).

³⁶ See the *Survey of Living Conditions* (Government of Jamaica) for the period.

³⁷ A number of surveys of the living conditions and unemployment rate in some of these communities were conducted by the Kingston Restoration Company. Some were done by students but they provide useful data on these communities.

NOTHING ABOUT FAMILY = could omit in the draft.

Some of the basic demographic characteristics and particularly the age structure of these areas are also problematic. National census data shows that the male population is young. In Denham Town and Wilton Gardens for example, some 73% and 76% respectively of all males are younger than 35 years. In neighbouring Rose Town, just over 74 percent of the population is below age 35 years. Some 46% of the population is male, *but 86% of all males are under 35 years old*. These data contrasts with the national population of which 66.43% of all males are below 35 years. It is this is age set that is more likely to enter gangs, engage in violence and provide a recruitment pool for the “shottas” of organised crime.

The levels of violence in and between these communities tend to be extraordinarily high. In 2005, the homicide rate for the city of Kingston was approximately 128\100,000.³⁸ Some of the communities within the Western section of Kingston, that is, the sections of the city where lower income households are most concentrated, are *at times* veritable war zones. In 2004, for example, the community of Denham town returned a homicide rate of 395\100,000.³⁹

(Mafia Republics) Inner-city residents face social exclusion and stigmatization. The association of their communities with violence, including violence that is directed at the security forces, has renewed and reinforced old stigmas that predate Independence.⁴⁰ As communities, their relationship to the law is similar to that of pariah groups in that

³⁸ Computed from data on reported homicides that were provided by the JCF and population estimated based on data that was provided by the PIOJ. This is an estimate as the reported homicides represent approximately 5% less than the true number of homicides and the estimate of the population for the KMA was 593,448.

³⁹ Computed from homicide data provided by the JCF.

⁴⁰ In the early 20th century the western sections of Kingston were already stigmatized as criminal haunts. See Moore and Johnson 2000.

they are treated as being outside of the law in two senses: being lawless, and not being entitled to protection by the law. Consistent with this, the police either ignore their problems or apply excessive force and disregard their rights as citizens (see Harriott 2000).

This reality creates the political space for self-policing and the other quasi-governmental activity of organised crime. If the failure to deliver the needed and expected social goods created the space for these groups to adopt this strategy, their provision of these services have helped to strengthen their social support base in these communities and indeed in the country. They have successfully exploited the alienation from the state and its incapacity to treat the problems of the poor.

Beyond its quasi-governmental activity, organised crime has set up an opportunity structure and offers an alternate or criminal career path to young marginalized males who anticipate social failure were they to persist in seeking conventional opportunities. It is an alternate route to realizing the social goods that they wish to acquire namely wealth, power, high status and respect. Acquiring the latter two by criminal means may be somewhat problematic, but at least they are able to acquire them within the subculture. In inner-city community settings where there are so many living examples of social failure, for young males, organised crime thus offers opportunities for social success.

The garrison communities are special cases of the relationship of organised crime to these communities and to the political parties.⁴¹ There, these relationships find intensive expression in the quasi-governmental activity of organised crime. The garrison has become a special mode of political administration whereby powerful criminal

⁴¹ See Stone (1985) for a discussion of the garrison phenomenon.

networks are a part of the *dominant coalition* that manages the affairs of the community. Criminal networks are the dominant local power. They negotiate with the political party as an agency and political force within it. There are thus constant tensions in the relationship between the parties and these groups as the dominant coalition locally is very different from the dominant coalition within the parties nationally. The garrison may be considered as a kind of local regime type which is based on the rule of a crime network-political party coalition. This “regime” seeks political monopoly and provides a safe haven for criminal networks.

The garrison is a new political creature. It reflects the post-independence failure to integrate the urban poor via the mainstream social and economic institutions (school and work) and in this context, the resort to corrupt methods of incorporating these excluded urban poor into the political system. It is thus in this type of community that the quasi-governmental functions of organised crime are most evident.

Earlier, the welfare services that are provided by the Dons were described. Its activities however extend to what are the core functions of the state, that is, the provision of security services and the administration of justice. Organised crime networks have effectively established a monopoly on the means and use of violence within the garrison communities. In some communities one is able to hold a personal illegal firearm only with the approval of the Don and even if the permit is granted, the individual is held to account for any armed action that he may take. On the basis of this monopoly, the crime networks have been able to engage in rule-making, the effective policing of these rules and punishment of rule violators. This is expressed in the “Jungle Courts.” The power of these networks is thus institutionalized in rules and administrative structures.

In the absence of proper state services, the people have come to value the services that are provided by organised crime (despite the abuses of power that they also suffer from these groups). It is not just the welfare services that are valued by also the violence related services. For example, the women feel that the “Jungle Courts” protect them from rapists and other predators. The people thus tend to regard themselves as stake-holders or rather share-holders with entitlements. Welfare benefits are treated as entitlements that are a return for their tolerance, loyalty and even ties to the leaders of the crime networks. Notions of mythical kinship may be exploited by these networks to build solidarity and a protective shield against the authorities.⁴² Kinship however implies responsibilities and obligations. Naming of the leaders of organised crime as “Father”, or “Prime Minister” is thus consistent with this.⁴³ Bad faith in delivering on his obligations may undermine community support for a particular Don (not the idea of organised crime) and leave the Don vulnerable to challenges from within the network and pressures from the police.

The relationship of organised crime with the communities of the urban poor allows them to play a gate-keeping role and to regulate access to these communities. External agencies that provide useful services to these communities must seek their approval of projects. Non-cooperation on the part of the Don may signal the failure of any such project. The regulation of access also applies to the political parties but with important differences. The parties command the support of sections of the population, and depending on the level and intensity of this support the Dons may threaten to lead a defection of the community to the opposing party. This tactic may be used to extract

⁴² This point is elaborated in a larger work by the author on Jamaica’s homicide problem.

⁴³ In the context of patrimonial relations or a grounding of the Don’s authority in highly personalized familial type relations both designations may be equated. Prime Minister is a father or mother figure. The Caribbean has had this tradition in its politics. Papa Doc Duvalier of Haiti and Uncle Gairy of Grenada were two of the most notorious cases.

resources from the party and/or state. In the case of the garrisons, the parties command the overwhelming and easily mobilized support of the people. Here the Dons may still leverage their gate-keeping positions, but within tighter limits.

The power and influence of the Dons due to their quasi-govenmental role, while expressive of the failures of the state, also reflects its adaptation to this failure by building partnerships that maintain a measure of party control, albeit weakened and negotiated.

Prefiguring the don of the 1980s was the “Ranking” of the 1970s, that is, the gang leader cum political militant. He too was a middle man – a representative of the urban marginalized that would represent his people to the outside world and extract from these outside agencies the needed goods. Davidson reports an interview with a gang member as follows:

.. the major Rankin is the most intelligent person, the man who can go out there and speak on your behalf, stand up for you and demand the things that you need.

That is the duty of the Rankin. He looks after his boys.” (Davidson 1997:94)

Like the Don of today, he had a duty to provide for the community. He was both client and patron. The Rankin(g) was a master gate-keeper who able to his leverage position in order to access the resources of the state.

“I want proof” - Relations with political Parties and the State

Crime has deep social roots, but Jamaican organised crime is both indirectly and directly a creature of the political process. The rise of organised crime is the unintended outcome

of public policies that have intensified the set of social problems that drive the rate of violent crime such as high levels of inequality and high rates of youth unemployment.⁴⁴ This is an indirect influence. Politics has also had a more direct influence on the rise of organised crime. It is this direct influence that for example led the (then) Superintendent of Police for the area that includes Spanish Town, Mr. Kenneth Wade, to state that “the support of the PNP has helped to fuel the criminality of the Clansman gang.”⁴⁵ A similar thing could be said of the relationship between the One Order network, which is the main rival of the Clansmen, and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). This is not a problem of a particular party or particular personalities within these parties; it is rather a more systemic problem. The relationship between organised crime and the parties is a partnership of institutional actors that serves to reinforce their respective power.

Its relationship to the political parties is a pivotal one for organised crime. This is what exponentially expands their criminally exploitable ties and opens the door to other exploitable relationships. It links the street criminal to those in the upper reaches of the power structure, links the “downtown” racketeers to the “uptown” racketeers, or as the Italians would put it, the (“low”) Mafia to the “high mafia.” This relationship multiplies the types and scale of the criminal enterprise. To the members of these criminal networks, the state is like an inexhaustible “gold mine” and their relationship with the political parties allows them to tap the large veins in these mines.⁴⁶ Being criminal entrepreneurs allows them to do this in ways that were not possible when they were simply gangsters. One of the more recent networks - that has limited community

⁴⁴ For a discussion of the impact of these variables on violent crimes see Farncis et.al. 2003, and Frost and Bennett 1998.

⁴⁵ See ‘I Want Proof’ – Haye-Webster denies Association with ‘Bulbie.’ By Tyrone Reid. *Daily Gleaner* 2\11\2005 page 1.

⁴⁶ Personal correspondence with a member of one of the major networks.

influence - targeted Jamaica House directly, and when this did not work, it targeted a politically ambitious Minister.⁴⁷ Affiliated firms have since had access to large government contracts via various devices. An ever expanding set of relationships has allowed this grouping to grow from doing contracts funded by a single Ministry, to working for an increasing number of government agencies and handling billions of dollars of state funds, and more recently, to even having access to private sector contracts (where the contracting firm is involved in partnerships with government or subject to ministerial influences).⁴⁸

Many examples of this kind of corrupt partnership may be found across the developed and developing countries. In the case of the US, the long history of these links have been documented especially in New York City and Chicago (see Repetto 2004; Kennedy, D. and Finckenhauer, J. 1994). The corruption-ridden Liberal Democratic Party of Japan is notorious for its relationship with organised crime groups in that country (see Hill 2004). Italian politics has been marred by the deep involvement of the Mafia and other organised crime networks. Santino notes that some 72 city councils were dissolved for “the presence of Mafia members as counselors, mayors, ...” (see Santino 2001). The problem was not restricted to local politics. There was also the remarkable case of former Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti who was charged with being a member of the Mafia. This case revealed how deep the ties of the mafia were to the Christian Democratic Party and how great was its influence in Italian politics. In Russia, “22 assistants to deputies of the State Duma were arrested (in 1995) for dealings with the

⁴⁷ Personal correspondence between the author and a former Jamaican House administrator. Later researchers who wish to explore these relationships will have the benefit of access to official documentation by using the Freedom of Information Act.

⁴⁸ See the *Angus report for a description of the types and sale of these kinds of fraud.

criminal world.” (see Gilinsky 2001 cited in Albanese and Das 2003:9). Representatives of Taiwanese organised crime is said to have successfully contested for “public office” in that country (see NIJ 2007:13), and to “sit in positions of local administration” and “play a key role in parliamentary elections” in Thailand. (see NIJ 2007:14). In India, the dons of organised crime play a prominent role in the politics of some states. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, they are said to be “an invisible force behind the continuance of every government in Uttar Pradesh.” (see Mishra 2004:36). Nigeria and Colombia have had similar troubles. For example, Pablo Escobar, one of the most notorious Drug Lords was during the earlier stages of his career, a member of the Colombian Senate.

In Jamaica, the linkage between the political parties and organised crime is most evident in the garrisons where as noted earlier, the Dons are integrated into political administration of the community. The garrison is clearly a creature of public policy. These communities were created by public funds as “social housing.” They were designed as party homogenous areas and constructed as such by a process that began with cleansing the locale of all supporters of the opposing party. Violent means were invariably used to achieve this and involved forced removals by the state security forces, and in some cases, armed terror by party militants. Having cleared the ground, social housing is then constructed and allocated on the basis of party affiliation. Tivoli Gardens and Arnett Gardens, the two major garrisons were created in this way.⁴⁹ The place of violence in the creation and maintenance of these communities led to the valorization of the violent elements and gave them high social status and authoritative roles in the administration of these communities. Criminals and armed militants, the one

⁴⁹ The bulldozing of Back-O-Wall which is the areas on which Tivoli Gardens was built is documented in the pages of the Daily Gleaner. The similar clearance of sections of Trench Town was done in the early 1970s and this too is documented in the Daily Gleaner.

indistinguishable from the other, thus became a prominent part of a system of tight party control.

The weakening of the state during and after the 1980s, and the new drug wealth that was acquired by the networks since then have had the combined effect of loosening the hold of the parties in the inner-city communities and altering the power relations between the parties and the criminal networks in these localities. This change is now reflected in the quasi-governmental functions of organised crime and the nature of the partnership with the parties. Channeling state funds to the crime networks is a part of the partnership. In turn, the dons make handsome contributions to the campaign funds of the candidates of their choice.⁵⁰ Money is passed in both directions. They are no longer simply party thugs but partners. The quasi-governmental functions of organised crime should therefore be seen in this context, that is, as the assisted activity of one of the partners (that benefits both but alters the power relations between them).

Enforcement is another dimension of this partnership. Organised crime has been involved in a range of enforcement and control functions (not just as part of the party system but as partners of the state). In April 1999, pro-government organised crime networks were involved in suppressing Opposition-led demonstrations against anticipated increases in the price of gasoline. During the course of the protests, demonstrators in the Downtown area of Kingston were attacked by thugs affiliated to the Spanglers network and were successfully driven from the streets. In recognition of their services to the ruling party, the then Prime Minister visited the community base of the Spanglers, greeted the

⁵⁰ There is not much hard evidence of this. However the author has actually witnessed a contribution from a know don that occurred openly at a party conference. Personal correspondence with members of the Jamaican Intelligence services and the political elite also suggests that this is truly a significant problem.

Donald Phipps (Zeeks) the acknowledged leader of the group, and spoke approvingly of Zeeks' efforts to counter the demonstrations. Considerable reinforcement of the specific type of activity was thus provided, and the general importance of the relationship between organised crime and the political parties underlined.⁵¹ The logic of this type of relationships is such that similar events may be found elsewhere, even in strong liberal democracies with low crime rates such as Japan. There, in 1988, a prominent leader of the Liberal Democratic Party "personally thanked and praised" a leader of an established organised crime group "for silencing extremist opposition to Takeshita Noboru's bid to become Prime Minister." (see Hill 2004:102).

These types of regulatory activities may be regarded as an extension of the control role that the Dons now play in the communities, and which now allows them to become actors on the national stage. Some of the Dons of organised crime have indeed advocated a social\political control partnership with the state that would take the form of a more overt and formalized working relationship with the police. As one had suggested "the illegal guns should work with the legal guns."⁵² What is proposed, and indeed obtains in some localities, is a partnership that involves the state delegating to the Dons the right to punish within the latter's "jurisdiction." This is already operationalised in the "Jungle Courts." The local jurisdiction of the don is exercised "in conjunction" with the state\police. As Blok has noted, it is precisely this joint exercise of power with the state that distinguishes *mafia* from other types of criminals. (see Blok 1974:94).

⁵¹ For a critical commentary on this development see an article by Dawn Rich entitled "He that Hath Ears better Hear." *Daily Gleaner* May 9, 1999 page 9A.

⁵² Form a personal interview as fieldwork for a larger work.

Thus collusion between organised crime on one hand, and the police and the political parties on the other, serves to legitimize the behaviour of OC as a power-holder in the inner-city communities. Tilly, approvingly citing Stinchcombe (1968), suggests that legitimacy is not assent to government, not simply the ruled believing that the rulers have the right to rule, but rather “the probability that other authorities (power-holders) will act to confirm the decisions of another authority (power-holder).” (Tilly 2002:...). Elsewhere (Harriott 2000) I call this a soft definition of legitimacy. It is a minimum condition that allows regime maintenance. The suggestion is that the relationship between the power-holders is the critical condition for legitimacy. This may bear a close resemblance to domination, but is a kind of “elite” consensus, a consensus among authorities. The use of the word authority is not immaterial. It suggests that the power-holders are authoritative, are in some measure accepted by the ruled or sub-populations of the ruled. The assent ruled is thus brought by in –albeit the passive assent. This point carries added force in the Jamaican context given its British colonial history of “descending authority” that is typical of the unbroken monarchial tradition. This is a tradition of deference and compliance that has lost its force in the post-Independence period, particularly after the Democratic Socialist disruption of the 1970s, but which still remains.

In the case of the garrisons, both sets of power-holders are thus in some sense authorities that have an active relationship with the people and constantly seek their support. Indeed the don is regarded as a “big-man” by which is meant a kind of traditional leader, that is (not someone who is representative of the marginalized out-group in which he has his origin but) someone who is regarded as a social success and an

institutional actor in the political system and local power structure. The power-holders in the communities, criminal and conventional, thus tend to reinforce each other in their respective roles.

As a central aspect of its quasi-governmental role and power projection within their “jurisdictions”, Organised crime networks have thus also become involved in other more everyday aspects of “public order policing.” City authorities have used them to encourage street vendors to use the markets and arcades – a task that has proved to be beyond the police force. Following the lead of the state, private businesses have also contracted organised crime networks to discipline the vendors. As partners of the state, elements of these networks were even incorporated into an embryonic parks and markets police. Unlike the regular state police, they have experienced very little resistance to their efforts and the usually disagreeable vendors have tended to be most compliant.

More troubling than their involvement in “public order policing” are instances when the leaders of organised crime are used to broker deals on behalf of the formal justice system in a manner that subverts the attempts of citizens to seek redress for injustices inflicted by agents of the state. Redress implies an ability on the part of the state to self-correct. It symbolises a commitment to justice and law. Tampering with this is thus particularly problematic, especially when the tampering introduces the agents of organised crime to the citizen-complainant as a negotiator on behalf of a state agency. This was done in the case of Janice Allen, a child who was accidentally shot by the police.⁵³ An attempt was made to use the local Don to negotiate a settlement with her family on behalf of the state. The don symbolises power that is unrestrained by law.

⁵³ Personal correspondence with a member of Jamaicans for Justice a well established human rights group.

Their involvement as intermediaries introduces intimidation into the process and suggests a reluctance on the part of elements in the state to be restrained by law.

Indeed this case, while being evidence of state-OC collusion in the administration of “justice”, if taken by itself may be seen as signaling a reinforcement of the marginalization of the inner-city poor by the state. It means that they do not have the protection of the law, and that violations of their rights by state agents may be settled under the threat of further violence by agents who are even less accountable to the law than the initial violators. The inner-city poor are confronted by two set of institutional power-holders, OC and the police, one illegal and the other holding legal authority but both occupationally associated with the use of violence and reinforcing its use by each other.

The above range of functions and roles highlights a tendency and hints at a system of rule that relies on organised crime in interfacing with the urban poor when *credible force and lawlessness* are required. It highlights the developing relationship between organised crime and the parties\state as a relationship that rests as much on the opportunities for corruption and material gain as on an increasing demand for violence.

THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE

The high level of violence that is associated with the territorially based organised crime networks is thus integral to its activity and relationships. Its activities create a demand for violence as this is needed to regulate illegal business transactions. An enforcement imperative is even greater in conditions of low trust. Organised crime uses violence liberally not just to settle particular disputes but as power projection. The instances of

violent conflict are treated as challenges to their power and opportunities to project power, achieve dominance over their competitors and their territory, and as a part of the process of trying to impose their monopoly on the use of violence within an expanding territorial domain.

Organised crime has thus added considerable thrust to Jamaica's homicide rate. In 2005, the homicide rate was 63\100,000 having increased from 19\100,000 in 1985.⁵⁴ At the time of writing in 2005, it was approximately three times the mean rate for Latin America and the Caribbean which is the region with the highest rate of ordinary criminal violence.

The violence of organised crime is rooted in:

- The type of criminal activity that it engages in, that is, activity such as extortion rackets which is inherently violent.
- The regulation of criminal transactions such as drug deals.
- Its quasi-governmental functions, that is, rule-making and rule-enforcement for whole communities.
- Its relationship to territory. Rule-enforcement within communities and the collection of tribute from subordinate criminal groups are violence prone.
- Its periodic confrontations with the security forces. In the special case of the garrisons-as-safe-havens, this involves using violence to exact a political and human price on the security forces that is so high that it deters them from entering these communities to effect arrests.

⁵⁴ Computed from data provided by the *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica* for the respective years. Suicides are excluded.

- Its involvement in competitive party politics – usually in the more violence prone communities where it may try to “switch” the political loyalties by encouraging defections among the community gunmen.

The combination of enterprise and enforcement, the power derived from wealth and control of significant means of violence, and the ability to use these means freely distinguishes organised crime from common criminality. Groups that operate on the corporate model may enjoy greater wealth and income but the patron-client, territorially based networks tend to enjoy greater power of enforcement. The latter may provide enforcement services for the former and may even extort the former. This has been the source of some of the conflicts between groups. Such problems must impel the more corporate oriented networks to improve their self-protective capabilities. As more actors develop their capabilities to deliver violence, continued increases in the rate of murder may be expected. A sharp separation of the *business enterprises* (suppliers of goods and various services) on one hand and the *violence enterprises* (specialist suppliers of violence related services) have therefore not yet occurred –although at the individual level there are specialists in the use of violence.⁵⁵ Evolution in this direction should lead to fewer groups engaging in criminal violence and a reduction in the homicide rate.

Violence is directed at the state authorities and violence is used in defense of the political administration and parties. The first category of violent activity increases the risks and human cost of effective law enforcement thereby forcing an accommodation or inducing an *entente cordiale* with organised crime. Examples of this are the repeated

⁵⁵ This type of specialization is more evident in Colombia where guerilla and paramilitary forces are able to extort the drug producing and trafficking networks.

battles between the security forces and the gunmen of Tivoli Gardens, the last of which was in July 2001 and which was the subject of a major inquiry.⁵⁶ Examples of the second type such as attacks on protestors have already been discussed. Some Dons have even made known their interest in the newspaper writings of critical commentators and have delivered cautionary notes.⁵⁷ Violence that is directed to achieve both of these ends erodes the democratic foundations of the state system.

While much of the violence of organised crime is profoundly instrumental, it is increasingly being delivered in a style that is expressive, indeed performative. For example, beheadings, gouging the eyes, and other forms of body mutilation are now all a part of the homicidal repertoire. After all this violence occurs in a context in which violence is widely used in everyday conflicts among ordinary citizens who are not engaged in **predatory** criminality and is becoming symbolically loaded and thus culturally performative (see Harriott 2005).

II

EXPLAINING THE RISE OF ORGANISED CRIME

Having described the rise of organised crime in Jamaica, in this section of the essay an attempt is made to sketch the outlines of an explanation of this development. As the above description includes elements of explanation, in this section only a summary that simply notes some of the antecedent processes, “root causes” or *preconditions* for the development of organised crime are presented. The more *proximate factors* or

⁵⁶ See the *Report of the West Kingston Commission of Enquiry* into the violent confrontation in Western Kingston during July 7–10, 2001.

⁵⁷ Personal communication with the author.

precipitants such as the growth of the international drug markets and the demand for protection, and the prime *facilitators* or enabling and permissive factors such as the social and political practices, attitude sets and patterns of thinking that are supportive of or positively sanction crime are given greater prominence in the analysis. Taken together, these three sets of factors are best treated as elements of a historical process (rather than aspects of a schema).⁵⁸

Organised crime is a global phenomenon that takes different forms. It is thus able to develop and thrive in a variety of environments. It is not always easy to distinguish between those conditions that are simply contextual and those that are necessary for the development and continued existence of organised crime. The factors associated with its rise in Jamaica are not completely abstracted from their historical context but rather are treated as elements of an integrated historical process. Undoubtedly there are contextual gaps which if filled would better illuminate the rise of the phenomenon, but later studies may remedy these weaknesses.

Elsewhere (Harriott 2000) I have argued that OC is socially embeddedness in the society. By this is meant that it enjoys *protective ties* that are grounded in deep, extensive and intricate social and political relationships. This embeddedness even finds expression at the levels popular beliefs or elements of an ideology that provides justification for the activities of OC as a pro-social and pro-poor actor, that is, a permissiveness with regard to this form of criminality that Gurr (with reference to terrorism) calls “social

⁵⁸ This paper represents a limited exploration of this process. It pulls from a larger work that is being undertaken by the author.

facilitation.”⁵⁹ Acknowledging this social support for OC and understanding its social bases is central to any explanation of it. Probing this aspect of the problem may help to systematize the analysis. Its social basis is constitutive of the social structural roots from which OC emerges, its ties with organised interests, and relations with citizens. Underpinning this social basis is the opportunity structure.

Exploring the conditions associated with the origins of OC helps to identify and understand its diverse forms and the processes associated with their evolution\dynamism. This accords considerable importance to its origins, but the originating conditions should be confused with the sustaining conditions. To confuse these two sets of conditions as factors accounting for OC is to commit a fallacy of origins. For example, the conditions associated with the origins of the Chinese Triads and the Italian mafia included local territorial isolation from the rest of the respective countries and a weak state presence in these localities. Today the Fujian province and Sicily are connected to the main centres and institutions of the respective countries, and in conditions of globalization, are strongly connected to the world, and are highly integrated into fairly powerful state systems. Organised crime has been able to adapt to these changes, has been able to survive sustained assaults by law enforcement against it, and in some cases grow even stronger. The fallacy of origins may be avoided by tracking the changes in the evolution of OC (for example to TOC) and in its main relationships, the changes in the environment, and the forces and processes that account for these changes. The originating forces may not be the sustaining forces. In the case of Jamaica, however, OC is a new

⁵⁹ See Gurr, T. 1979. *Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s*. in Michael Stohl, ed. *The Politics of Terrorism*. New York: ... cited in Crenshaw, M. 1979. *The Causes of Terrorism*. In Catherine Besteman. 2001. *Violence – A Reader*. New York: New York University Press.

phenomenon and so there is not much difference in time (and environmental conditions) between origins and contemporary situation.

Conditions associated with its Origins- its Social structural Roots

The immediate post-Independence period high was one of high aspirations. Political change was expected to bring meaningful social and economic change and a higher living standard for the people. The colonial legacy of high levels of inequality and the associated obstructions of race and class exclusion were to be ended, and high growth rates and industrialization were expected to reduce unemployment and poverty. Yet this promise contrasted sharply with the realities and capacity of the state to deliver the expected social goods. The mobilization of the people as reflected in the rate of rural to urban migration exceeded the capacity of the fledgling industries to absorb them resulting the even higher rates of unemployment\ youth unemployment and the growth of shanty towns in the vicinity of the industrial belt of the capital city. Mobilization was quickly followed by + economic + political crises of the 1970s. Thus the first two decades = 1960s and 1970s were periods of social dislocation, strain associated with the high but unmet aspirations of the urban mobilized poor = conditions for high rates violent crime. These conditions are however insufficient conditions for the emergence of organised crime.

Enduring and intensely concentrated social disadvantage that is encountered in the urban inner-city communities that already described above, corrupt state and political institutions, illegal market opportunities of a certain scale and type and a low risk

environment together tend to provide fertile conditions for organised crime to emerge and flourish. The major organised crime networks in Jamaica have evolved from ordinary urban gangs that emerged in the harsh conditions of the communities of the marginalized urban poor. What is common to this evolution is their relationship to politics. If the social conditions in urban Jamaica have been conducive to the development of violent crime, the formation of gangs, and the emergence of a protective subculture marked by a code of silence, that is, conditions that constitute a good incubator for the emergence of organised crime, politics has been the mid-wife that delivered it.

The career and evolution of Group 69 illustrates the role of the political parties in the emergence of organised crime. Group 69 was an affiliate of the PNP which was active in the period after the first elections based on universal adult suffrage in 1944 and which later spawned the Spanglers as a group of politically affiliated gangsters. The Spanglers evolved into what may be called “Spanglers International,” a transnational network involved in drug trafficking and drug dealing in the US. Later it became a major local player in a more diverse set of illegal enterprises in Jamaica. It has not yet become the “Spanglers Conglomerate,” but its behaviour suggests that it may have these aspirations, and other organised crime networks have shown that it is possible to achieve this if they are prepared to also set up businesses that provide licit goods and services (funded by criminal accumulation) and to give a more corporate shape to their structure and activity.

There have thus been four clear phases in the development of this network. It is not necessary to discuss all four phases as much of this has already been done above as stages in the career of organised crime. In the first phase, Group 69 provided *protection* of the PNP in the form of supplying it with its street fighters. The early career of the

group or more specifically its role in the general elections of 1949 is discussed in Sives (2003). A similar violent competitiveness among the party affiliated trade unions which was an extension of the political competitiveness increased *the demand for protection* and meant that toughs on both sides were welcomed and their contributions valued as a defence of the democratic rights of the party and trade union competitors. Later, in the 1960s, Group 69 also played an important role in the violent competition between the political parties in the impoverished districts of Western Kingston.⁶⁰ With the consolidation of the constituency of Western Kingston as a JLP dominant zone, this group (in its different forms) has since retained its importance to the PNP by containing the JLP and limiting its further expansion in the area.

Party competitiveness intensified in the mid-1970s through to the early 1980s when there was a sharp programmatic and ideological divergence of the two major political parties. After the mid-1970s these political conflicts became violent with most of this violence being concentrated in the communities of the urban poor where the level of ordinary criminal violence was already high. During this period, the party affiliated gangs became virtual party militias thereby consolidating the relationships with their respective parties. There was thus an unbroken line of continuity in the relationships and in the violence especially in Western Kingston (meaning now the south western section of the city rather than the constituency of Western Kingston) with the Spanglers playing a prominent role in this period as well.

The construction of Tivoli Gardens as a garrison community served to consolidate the constituency of Western Kingston for the JLP and to provide favourable conditions for the rise of what later became known as the Shower Posse which is arguably the most

⁶⁰ See Lacy (1977) for a discussion of political violence during this period.

powerful organised crime network in Jamaica and a long-standing enemy of the Spanglers. The fortunes of the latter may have been very different had the PNP been in power in the 1960s. Empowered by state support, they would probably have become a much more important force in party politics and in organised crime. Instead the Shower network, which was the beneficiary of the first garrison in Tivoli Gardens, more quickly emerged as a “super power” in organised crime.

The career of Group 69 highlights the role of the political parties and successive political administrations in the evolution of organised crime in Jamaica. More generally, it is a story of how the connections to powerful and critical institutions were made and the importance of this for the development of organised crime. As important a condition as this was and is, it is however not sufficient. As outlined above, Jamaican politics had created a demand for violence and the thugs of the time supplied it behind the powerful protective shield that politics provided it. The leaders of these gangs thus acquired reputations as ruthless men of violence, reputations which were later used to provide protection to private business as protection and extortion business. This history of political service propelled these groups along a trajectory of providing violent services, of probable violent entrepreneurship. Its ties to politics did not however give the Spanglers an enterprise or market orientation - the international illicit drug economy would provide this.

Illegal Entrepreneurial Opportunities

International drug markets “Enterprise theory” argues that the demand for illicit goods and services is a necessary condition for the emergence of organised crime (see Smith

1980). This demand must be sustained and the profits must be sufficiently high in order to attract the criminal entrepreneur. In the context of globalization, the demand for illicit goods need not be local. Thus in the 1980s, as was the case with the Spanglers, other Jamaican crime networks that were involved in the drug trade also became transnational networks. Since the 1960s, the demand for illicit drugs had been rising in the US, but in the 1980s, this was further stimulated by the crack “revolution.” Supplier crime networks from the producer countries sought to cash in on this by entering the retail market in the US.

Jamaican networks were well positioned to exploit these opportunities. Geographically, Jamaica is advantageously situated to facilitate the transshipment of South American cocaine to the US. The relationships between Jamaican networks and international drug traffickers were well established as Jamaicans have been major suppliers of cannabis from as early as the 1960s. In the 1970s, the poor political relationship between the Jamaican and American governments and the consequent weakening of law enforcement cooperation were exploited by the traffickers. Large quantities of drugs were airlifted by private aircraft from the many illegal air strips across the island. (ADD NOTE ON THE NUMBER OF AIRSTRIPS DESTROYED IN THE 1970s.) At the end of the 1970s, Jamaican networks were fully involved in the export of ganja. The challenge of the 1980s was to diversify the product line (adding processed or valued added ganja products and cocaine and cocaine products) and to get into the retail trade in the US either as direct suppliers and/or as supplier-dealers.

In these conditions a range of independent criminal entrepreneurs emerged including a rural-based type. Their relationship to territory is quite different from that of

the urban OC networks but community opportunity structure was also important in their emergence. For example, proximity to illegal airstrips created jobs as loaders of ganja airplanes, protectors of drug warehouses and these jobs facilitated contacts with international traffickers (pilots and dealers) that could be used to launch international criminal careers. As was in the case in the urban areas, political activism assisted this process by facilitating contacts with corrupt party affiliated police officers, and helps in forging protective relationships with the communities. Even in these conditions, politics was thus a critical part of the illegal opportunity structure.

Their ties to politics tend to track their entrepreneurial accomplishments. And, as unlike their urban counterparts they may not have acquired national notoriety from persistent involvement in violence and garrison politics, they are better able to participate in legitimate business and to form corrupt partnerships with professionals, legitimate business persons and selected politicians. Their political influence rests less on their ability to directly deliver votes and more on their money.

*For this type and more generally those of entrepreneurial origin, institutional factors (money, status, respect as social values) may be more weighty in the explanation of their rise that are social factors (inequality, youth unemployment, exclusion) although they are best understood in their relationship to the latter.

This type is non-territorial in origin and typically has a limited independent capacity to deliver violence. Some will take losses due to bad faith without killing and tend to rely on corrupt police officers for protection. However with their growth, some may be expected to become more violent, especially if they try to claim territory, overtly engage in politics and the supply of services to the state (as in the case of their urban

entrepreneurial counterparts). Territorial attachment brings new challenges including having an independent capacity to deliver violence. This may be subcontracted to other groups that are more competent in this field and which tend to be of the same political affiliation but this brings tensions between types of groups (violent entrepreneurs vs drug-enterprise criminals). Explains some of the violence between grouping affiliated to the same party that occurred in the late 1990s and which have continued up to the time of writing.

This territorialization may be a pattern that develops in the areas that have been experiencing rapid urbanization such as along the south coast conurban corridor from Kingston to May Pen and perhaps on to Mandeville and in the north coast city of Montego Bay. With this a more national spread of violence must be expected. Some networks have however not followed this pattern and remain entrepreneurial, corporate and fixed on the US drug market.

The migration of the gangs that later became organised crime networks was influenced by the pull of the US drug markets but also by a push out of Jamaica that was partly influenced by the political process. In the 1970s, non-cooperation between the parties led to a breakdown in the old arrangements that allowed for the allocation of some state benefits to the supporters of the Opposition. The JLP gangsters thus became more outward looking. After the general elections of 1980 which resulted in the defeat of the PNP administration, many of its gangster-militants fled to the US for fear of being selectively eliminated by special squads in the police force.

External accumulation has enabled those networks that became truly transnational to consolidate their power in Jamaica. Organised crime has been able to use its new found wealth, influence and power to alter its relationships with the political parties. Instead of always being the recipient of state contracts at the behest of the political leadership, the networks are now able to fund party candidates. Funding successful candidates increases their influence in the legislature which must pass laws concerning organised crime. It strengthens their influence in the parties and better positions them for partnerships with the “high mafia” that exploit the resources of the state. This takes us to the problem of corruption and more broadly the social facilitation of OC.

Corruption and the Facilitating conditions

Social and political facilitation involves the social and political habits or patterns of behaviour and thinking that positively sanction crime and particularly OC. It contributes to the climate of permissiveness or a social milieu in which OC is able to thrive. This includes the indirect facilitation of patterns of thinking that are apologetics for crime that find popular expression in everyday life and in popular culture where they may even serve to romanticize OC. The following report on the appeal to the court for bail by Donald “Zeeks” Phipps illustrates this. His lawyer argued that he was a good protector of his community and that during the period of his imprisonment on charges of murder the crime rate in the Down-town area Kingston had increased. It was therefore in the interest of the country that he be released on bail – presumably so that he could return to his business of running the protection racket in the Down-town area. The lawyer’s words

were approvingly reported in a highly respected national newspaper.⁶¹ (see DG ..2006). Similarly, in a television interview, a then Minister of Government described a particular OC affiliated firm as one of the most “efficient” contractors to the government and its owner as his “friend.”⁶² Both regard OC as delivering valued social service and indeed in some cases primary public goods such as public security. This, the more indirect aspect of social facilitation that is expressed in patterns of thinking that take a more coherent near ideological form is more fully explored elsewhere.⁶³ Here focus on the more *direct* forms of facilitation of which corruption is the most pernicious.

State corruption has played a critical role in the consolidation of organised crime in Jamaica, (that is, in the current phase of the relationship between criminal networks and the political parties). In 2005, Jamaica’s ranking on the corruption perception index was 64th of the 159 countries surveyed and its score was 3.6 out of 10 where 1 represents the highest level of corruption.⁶⁴

State corruption in the contemporary period must be understood in the context of the passing of the idealism of the early post-Independence era and a shift from programmatic mobilisation to the professionalisation of politics and greater reliance on patronage as a tool for political mobilisation. In recent years, there have been charges of maladministration in a number of state agencies including the National Housing Development Cooperation (NHDC),⁶⁵ and the National Solid Waste Management

⁶¹ See *Daily Gleaner* ...page ..2006.

⁶² A recording of this interview exists and I have viewed it more than once but I hope that readers will kindly pardon me for not citing it here.

⁶³ This is work on a manuscript that is still in progress.

⁶⁴ See Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2005.

⁶⁵ In the case of the NHDC, for example, Danhai Williams was charged with defrauding the agency of \$450 million. See the *Daily Gleaner* December 15, 2005 page 1.

Authority.⁶⁶ Organised crime has been able to access state contracts on a new scale, that is, contracts that are cumulatively valued at billions of dollars. Elements in the state have become partners in enterprise crime.

In their apologetics for corrupt practices, public officials promote a benign view of organised crime as normal business. Some officials have for example claimed that the firms that receive state contracts are “efficient” high performance companies. There may be some truth in this as these firms are not confronted with labour and extortion problems. The difficulty is that they also efficiently undermine the core principles of good governance as the systems of accountability are corruptly subverted in order to favour them. An outcome of this process is that institutions vital to the proper functioning of the state are corrupted and actually become contributors to the crime problem. This unfortunately also applies to the police.

A Weak Criminal Justice System\Immunity and the waiving of negative sanctions

Where there are high levels of corruption within law enforcement agencies, wealth and influence easily immunizes high-end criminals against police action. This is certainly the case in Jamaica. Moreover, the criminal justice system is in some respects antiquated and overloaded and thus unable to effectively respond to the more sophisticated criminal networks. Associated institutions including the existing laws are also in some respects inadequate for dealing with organised crime. For example, in responding to extortion rackets, the police must rely on the Larceny Act of 1943 and more specifically a subsection of this Act on “Demanding money etc with menaces.” In

⁶⁶ See “Solid Waste Scandal -\$2 billion breach at National Solid Waste Authority.” In the *Daily Gleaner* July 28, 2005.

order to disable the criminal firms that run these rackets, the police must be able to connect the lower level operatives to the leaders of these firms, but the laws have not been specifically designed to facilitate this by for example allowing criminal conspiracy charges to be laid against the leaders of these networks. Consequently, since 2000, the number of arrests for this crime has not been significant enough for the police to record it as a separate category of crime and to report it in the annual police crime statistics. This crime is therefore still statistically invisible. Legislation designed to better control organised crime is just now being processed. Proceeds of crime, money laundering, and anti-corruption acts, (most of which are responses to external pressures) have only recently been passed or have been tabled as a part of the legislative agenda of the parliament.

The case load of the investigative units of the police is a good indicator of the degree of immunity from law enforcement (not crime-fighting) that is enjoyed by criminals. For effectiveness, the number of investigators should be greater than the number of cases to be investigated. Instead, divisional homicide investigators are for example burdened with a case-load of 12-15 homicides, and this was in 2000.⁶⁷ (see PERF 2001:49). Not surprisingly, in 2004, the clear-up rate for murder (the number of arrests as a percentage of all reported murders) was 44.8% and the clear-up rate of violent crimes, that is, the most serious offences against the person (murder, shootings, rape, and robbery aggregated) was 39.8%.⁶⁸ For serious crimes, the clear-up rates are poor, and

⁶⁷ See *Violent Crime and Murder Reduction in Kingston*. Police Executive Forum, Washington, DC – Final Report – January 2001. page 49.

⁶⁸ See the *Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica 2004* page 24.3.

given the case-load ratios, the conviction rates are unsurprisingly low. In the case of murder, the conviction rate is estimated at less than 20%.⁶⁹

The clearance rates of the courts may also be taken as an indicator of immunity. It may indicate problems with the investigative process as well as incapacities and managerial difficulties in having the cases adjudicated. Given the sheer number of new cases at the known clearance rate, each year, some cases will be terminated due to administrative failure. Consistent with the pattern of criminal offending in Jamaica whereby a high proportion of all crimes are violent, while the lower courts report satisfactory clearance rates, the higher courts are overloaded and suffer from low clearance rates. The clearance rate in the Supreme Court approximates 30% and the situation in the Gun Court is similarly problematic (see CGCED 2000: 47).

Moreover, as noted earlier, there is considerable social support for the territorially based organised crime networks. This is a significant source of their immunity to police action. Communities support and protect these networks because it is difficult to see their quasi-governmental functions and partnerships with the political parties as solely serving criminal goals and as means of entrenching their power. On the contrary it is (mistakenly) seen as a kind of social banditry or Robin Hood criminality that serves the poor. The relationship between the networks and the political parties, an important piece in the protective armour of the networks, is in turn conditioned by this social support for the Dons. *The benefits that are gained from organised crime at both the community and national levels (such as foreign exchange inflows) are sources of the ambivalence about the Dons of organised crime. This ambivalence saps the civic and political will to respond effectively to organised crime and explains why, despite the high levels of*

⁶⁹ Estimate computed by the author for a study that is in progress.

violence that is associated with the activities of organised crime, there has not been any sustained civic action and movement against it.

Most Dons therefore have a clean (Jamaican) criminal record. Some may have been arrested but not convicted. At the time of his conviction for murder in 2006, Zeeks had no prior convictions for serious crimes. At his sentencing hearing, character witnesses could therefore be called to speak of his “kindness” and “good works” on behalf of the poor.⁷⁰ Prior to his conviction on a charge of shooting with intent (to kill), Joel Andem, a former leader of the notoriously violent Giddeon Warriors gang had been convicted of only petty crimes, which occurred in the early stage of his criminal career. The existing leaders of the major organised crime networks are not wanted by the police for any crimes. At the time of writing this essay, none were on the publicly announced Most Wanted lists of the police. They may thus freely cultivate exploitable relationships that extend into the political administration and the state bureaucracy; relationships that further empower and protect them from law enforcement and even public exposure. The Jamaican situation therefore presents difficult challenges for controlling organised crime.

III

APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING ORGANISED CRIME

There are different perspectives on how the society should respond to organised crime. These include *peace-making*, *co-option*, and *suppression* by unconventional crime-fighting and/or conventional law enforcement.

Organised crime ought not to be treated like regular criminality. Any attempt to elaborate an effective strategy to deal with it must begin with recognition of its power

⁷⁰ See “Life Without Zeeks is Tough” by Howard Campbell in the *Sunday Gleaner* June 4, 2006 page A6.

and influence and their sources. *Peace-making* reflects recognition of its power but suggests a misunderstanding of the sources of this power and of its nature. Peace-making is useful when applied to conflict groups. Organised crime may be involved in conflicts that are named as inter-community conflicts, but it is quite different from and should not be treated as a conflict group or simply as partisans in these conflicts.

At times there is considerable community pressure to pursue the peace-making approach, that is, to find a non-policing resolution of the violence between the gangs. The success of this strategy rests to a large measure on the power of the people in the localities and their ability to resolve the disputes and to effect some informal social control over the youth gangs that are involved in these conflicts. However even when applied in those circumstances, the efforts of the community will remain largely ineffective if law enforcement is ineffective. Given the power over and hold of organised crime on the communities in which they operate, the prospect of informal community control over their activities does not arise. In such conditions, when peace-making is extended to treating organised crime, it effectively becomes a discourse of decriminalization that leaves their businesses and methods intact. Indeed for organised crime networks peace-making that involves the police as a party to the negotiations entails amnesty and freedom from police action.

If peace-making is an inappropriate response to organised crime, so too is *co-optation*. This involves formally incorporating the Dons as part of the system of state control. As discussed earlier, this is already a shadowy reality. The idea has appeal because it is understood to mean that they would help to police the inner-city

communities and be accountable to the police force. Such a policy would provide state recognition of the current reality thereby taking it out of the shadows and it is believed, would adding a measure of accountability.

As described above, a partnership for political control (not law enforcement) already exists between the political administration\political parties and organised crime. Converting this to co-option by the state for law enforcement seems to overestimate the power of the state to successfully co-opt these networks. Any attempt to do this by an enfeebled state under which organised crime has flourished may only open the door to a return to politicization of policing and politically selective criminal enforcement (in the sense of targeting the less influential criminals) but also more deeply mire the police in criminality. Only a powerful state could successfully co-opt elements within the networks as this is not likely to work unless there are consequences for non-compliance with the rules governing such a process and for the continuation of their criminal enterprises. And if the state could enforce its rules governing the incorporation of the leaders of organised crime into its law enforcement machinery, then perhaps it would be able to successfully repress organised crime by other means.

Crime-fighting methods have been used against organized crime and the more violent gangs. The results have not been good as is evidenced by the tendency for the rate of violent crimes to increase and for the networks to grow. Indeed crime-fighting methods such as the elimination of the leaders of these groups have only precipitated more violence over leaders succession and efforts at alter the balance of power between competing groups.

Effective Law Enforcement is a more appropriate response to organized crime. **(BUT HAS ITS LIMITATIONS =discuss these below)** The more successful law enforcement strategies against organised crime that have been distilled from international experiences are generally known. Effective law enforcement requires actions that at least end the ability of the networks to act with impunity and at best put the firms, not just their individual members, out of business. Such measures typically target their wealth and income, and in the Jamaican context, would also need to target the relationships that protect and sustain their activities including the relationships with the communities, party, state and business.

Their wealth and income streams are important sources of their power, including their referent power. Removal of the main symbols of success, that is, their wealth and money, diminishes their power and social support. In this regard, various nations have made good use of legislation on assets forfeiture. After first passing a feeble bill, at the time of writing, the Jamaican legislature was considering a revised bill. Legislative “modernization” is useful but should also be accompanied by police and justice system “modernization” that would improve the investigative competences of the police, control corruption, and a “modernize” its relationship with and service to the people. This has been extensively discussed elsewhere.⁷¹

Confiscating the wealth of organised crime may prove difficult if the relationships that empower and protect them are not broken or at least weakened. This means most of all cutting the links between the political parties and organised crime. One of the best ways of doing this is to ensure that state contracts are not awarded to firms that are affiliated with the organised crime networks. This would cut the flow of funds in one

⁷¹ See Harriott 2000.

direction, that is, from the state to the organised crime networks. A legally acceptable method of operationalising this suggestion presents some challenge. One seemingly simple enough solution may be to impose the requirement that all contractors satisfy the standard of being “fit and proper.”⁷² This device is used in the granting of licenses to stock brokers and there is no obvious reason why it should not be applied in granting of state contracts to all service providers. Regulating political party funding in a manner that forces transparency regarding contributions to the parties and accountability for all funds that are spent may cut the flow of funds in the other direction, that is, from organised crime to the parties thereby reducing the direct political influence of the Dons. Such measures would rupture the relationship between the parties and organised crime by weakening its material underpinning.

Supporting legislation such as conspiracy laws that would allow public officials who assist the flow of state funds to organised crime enterprises to be charged as criminal coconspirators would assist the realization of these objectives. For example, when a government Minister or Mayor of a city signs documentation awarding a contract to a firm that is a front for organised crime, this should be sufficient grounds on which to charge him\her for being part of a criminal conspiracy. Such legal provisions should be accompanied by supporting measures such as requiring the police to list all criminal enterprises and to make these lists available to all contract granting authorities.

State agencies that have established a pattern of corrupt practices and which repeatedly conduct business with firms that are affiliated to organised crime networks should be placed under a special trusteeship that is given the authority to reengineer their

⁷² I thank my colleague Professor Barry Chevannes for instigating that I find a legally acceptable device for operationalising my proposal that organised crime networks be denied access to state contracts, and Professor Alfred Francis for bringing this device to my attention.

systems of accountability and to purge their managerial staff of incompetent and corrupt facilitators of organised crime, and where necessary, the trustees should be enabled to pass death sentences on these agencies. The US has used trusteeships that are empowered by their courts under the Civil RICO laws to sanitize such organizations. It is an unnoticed aspect of the celebrated decline in crime in the city of New York. (see Jacobs 1999). In Jamaica, the Contractor General should be empowered to initiate a systems review of such organisations and to apply to the courts for such offending agencies to be placed under trusteeships.

“Yardie” networks and “Posses” were weakened in the US and UK because they do not enjoy the protective relationships in those countries. They may benefit from the indifference and alienation in some immigrant communities, but have no political influence, institutional support and relations with conventional businesses. By rupturing the key relationships, and seizing their assets, law enforcement ought to be able to put the criminal firms out of business. On this foundation, prevention measures that are aimed at the root causes of crime and at weakening the relationship of organised crime with the communities of the poor may be more effectively undertaken.⁷³

As the crime-party nexus is strongest in the garrison communities, severing this relationship must involve dismantling the garrison communities. This would help to remove the immunity that organised crime now enjoys.⁷⁴

The problem is however not restricted to the garrisons. The relationship between the crime networks and the inner-city communities may be weakened by better

⁷³ Investing billions of dollars into inner-city transformation before breaking the hold of organised crime on these networks, only transfers a significant proportion of these funds to them. For example workers on housing projects may be required to pay over a percentage of their salaries to these networks.

⁷⁴ See the *Report of the National Committee on Political Tribalism 1997*.

integrating these communities into the mainstream of society. Strengthening the institutional linkages to the mainstream of the society (via schools, voting, the provision of effective rights regarding police services, tax-paying) is one way of doing this. Successful integration involves the provision of quality services that truly equip these citizens for participation in the labour force, in business, in politics, and all aspects of life. On this basis, a transformation of these communities may be effected by tackling youth unemployment, housing, infrastructure, the nature of their encounters with politics and relationship to the political institutions and the state, and their responsibilities as citizens. It is not just the physical environment that ought to be transformed, but also the social environment including the relationship of inner-city communities to the society and its key institutions. The relationship to work is critical, as status, notions of self-worth, identity (especially male identity) and dignity are bound up with it. Apart from its other benefits, such a programme would undermine the social support base of organised crime. Forced out of the communities of the poor, they may adapt and become more corporate, but would nevertheless become more vulnerable to police action. These are not comprehensive measures, the intent was simply to sketch the approaches that have been found appealing in sections of the political elite and the mass publics, to suggest an approach or direction that shows some promise.

CONCLUSION

Organised crime emerged in Jamaica after a long period of gestation. Socio-economic conditions that favour high rates of violent crime, international market opportunities, ineffective law enforcement and thus increased demand for protection and other services

locally (at the community level and with firms), competitive party politics that stimulated the demand for violence – all provided the conditions that fostered its development. Official corruption and community support have allowed it to flourish.

In this situation controlling organised crime presents difficult challenges for the society. There are problems of civic and political will and different political coalitions may seek to resolve their relations with organized crime in different ways (with some coalitions relying more on it as a player in the political process and others relying on it less). Beyond this are also real problems of resource limitations, problems of institutional capacity and capability.

There are a number of conditions for the success of any sustained effort to reply to organised crime. These include, solving the problem of ambivalence toward organized crime that exists in the society, and extends into the political elites, and developing a societal consensus about the direction of the response. Civic resistance to organised crime is thus important in achieving these political conditions. However, as the Bulbie demonstrations have hinted, organised crime is an active player in these power struggles. Public opinion and a more active citizenry will have to weigh in.

TABLES TO BE ADDED

- 1. Drug trafficking – Jamaica compared**
- 2. Drug production in Jamaica**
- 3. Extortion by economic sector (from data set)**
- 4. Deportations**
- 5. Gang wars in Kingston 1985-2005**
- 6. Violent Clashes with the SFs**

Table 1

Regional Mean Scores and ranks on composite organized crime index (COCI) and data on source indicators: perceived organized crime prevalence, extent of shadow economy, rates of unsolved murders per 100,000 population, grand corruption, and

	Average of the COCI and (Rank)	OC Perception (rank)	Informal sector (rank)	Unsolved homicides (rank)	High Level corrup
.....					
Central America	50(5)	4	13	3	8
Near and Middle East	50(6)	7	6	11	1
WORLD	54				
South Asia					
North Africa					
East Africa					
Southern Africa	56(10)	10	12	5	12
South America	58(11)	11	14	10	13
SouthEast					
Europe	58(12)	15	10	12	9
West and Central Africa	60(13)				
East Europe	70 (14)	17	16	14	14
Central Asia	70 (15)	16	-	13	15
Caribbean	70(16)	9	15	-	16

Source: Van Dijk 2006:5. in OC folder?

Table 2

Major Gang wars 1985-2006 (involving OC)

Major wars	Year	Duration	# killed	displaced	Politicized
Tivoli\Rema 1					
Tivoli\Rema 2	1994?				yes
Tivoli\Spanglers 1					yes
Shower\Mr Chin					no
Hannah town					
Tela\					
Mountain View					yes
Mountain View	2006				
Rockfort\Danai	2006				yes
Dunkirk\					
The Willie Haggart war					yes
The Pang\ Craig Tn war					
Rema internal	2006				
Park vs 100 lane					
Andrew Pang \Grants Pen wars					
One Order\Clan 1 (after local govt elections)					yes
One Order\Clan 2 (the one that we\PMI intervened in)					
Clan vs other JLP					yes
Clan vs One order 3					
Russia\Skeng	2006	-07	Skeng's guns stolen		
Norwood					
Stone Crusher					

Jungle\ Torrington Park 2007 (a three year war of succession etc). 19 killed in 2007 over stolen gun (see Newspapers April-May 2007)

Major defined in terms of duration and number killed, or simply that OC involved. The intra-community wars included?

TABLE 3

Major Violent clashes between Organised Crime and the SFs 1990-2006

Gangs involved	Year	Duration	# killed	#injured	politicized
Tivoli Gardens			27		yes
Mountain View					
Tivoil\Police (after the Waterloo killings)					no
Rema\Police1					yes (Seaga)
Hannah Town (the Haggart war)					yes (seaga)
Clan\ SFs ?					
One Order\SFs (court house burned etc)					
The Bulbie demo ((anti-Phillips)					yes
Canterbury\SFs	2005?	2 days			no

Table 4

Control of criminals: Homicide Data from Selected Communities 2000-2006
(frequency counts not rates)

Community	Year			
	2000	2002	2004	2006
Tivoli				
Matthew's Lane	0	0	1	1
Parade Gardens	0	0	0	0
Rock Fort	9	2	8	20
Trench Town	8	4	11	9
Rema				
Jones Town				
Arnett Gardens				
De La Vega city				
One order city				

Source: JCF Statistics Unit

The above table to be discussed under relations with citizens (= the monopoly tendency of OC and its place in the local political administration = criminal control)

Table 5

Selected Organised Crime figures in Party Politics

Name	Area	Party	Years	Charges	Convictions
Tony Brown	E\Kgn	PNP		1970s-	
George Flash	E\Kgn	PNP			
Delly Bap*	E\Kgn	PNP			
Dayton “Scotchbrite” Williams (killed by Zeeks = no apology)					
Danhai Williams					
	C\Kgn				
Donald Phipps	W\Kgn	PNP			Murder
Glenford Phipps	W\Kgn	PNP			
Coke Dudus	W\Kgn	JLP			
Lester Cooke	W\Kgn	JLP			Extradited*
Charles Miller	W\Kgn	JLP			Extradited
Vivian Blake	W\Kgn	JLP		Extradited\Racketeering	
Bya	W\Kgn	JLP			
Tony Welch	W\Kgn	PNP			Deported\drug*
Joel Andem	E\St. And.	JLP?			
Buba Smith	Sp Tn	JLP			deported
Bulbie	SpTn	PNP			never convicted
Bun Man	SpTn	JLP			
Black \Skeng	South coat	PNP			
Bunny Wissy\Genetic connection – Solid Waste					
Dedo Wiliams	St. Ann	JLP\PNP			Extradited

Kenley Stephenson(Bebe) MoBay PNP (was member of the NEC). Trial coming up.

Spy MoBay PNP Extradited

Ramcharan MoBay JLP? Extradited

From Canterbury?

*** = never convicted in Jamaica**

APPENDIX

Chronology of the development of OC in Jamaica

Large loads of ganja exports

1970s

Ganja valued at \$19m seized see DG 26\10\06

Airfields destroyed

Aircraft seized by size of craft

Cocaine trafficking

List some of the big cases in the news

The Colombians in Kingston harbour

The Aircraft at MoBay airport on the to Mexico (just before the Canterbury events)

Kilos transshipped = the year with the highest siezures

Transnationalization

Retail in the US

Retail in the UK

Colombians affiliated to the AUC found in a room in Montego Bay with US\$3m.

Estimated income of Shower = US\$200m – 199?

Arms trafficking

The Bulbie find

The finds in MoBay after the Canterbury gunfight with the SFs

Trafficking from Haiti

State Contracts

Danai Defrauds NHDC

Skeng

Zeeks and MPM

Dudus' firm and the KSAC

Minister declares Skeng's firm one of the most efficient

Extortion

Donald Phipps found with J\$18m. in cash – May 2005

Jungle courts and criminal control

Birth of the Tivoli prototype

Proliferation of the courts

Zeeks charged for Jungle Justice

The wars

Spanglers vs Shower

Clan vs One Order

The MoBay wars

Convictions

Joel Andem of Giddeon Warriors - conviction

Kevin "Richie" Tyndale of Giddeon Warriors - convicted for murder

Zeeks - conviction for murder 2006

Tesha Miller - The successor to Bulbie as head of the Clansman extradited from the US to face charge of triple murder committed on May 2, 2005. (see DG\Observer May 2, 2007). Was convicted on bail violation and given 9 months in prison – May 2007.

Extraditions

Vivian Blake

Jim Brown - extradition procedures hastened his death by fire in a cell at GP

Spy – extradition on drug trafficking charges

Ramcharan - extradition on drug trafficking charges

Dedo Williams - extradition on drug trafficking charges

Peace negotiations

One order and Clan

Politics

Attendance at funerals

Speng and donation to PNP

Seaga and dirty money

Zeeks thanked by PJ

The PNP Presidential race

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